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I.

INTRODUCTION

“MAN is born free; and everywhere he is in chains.”1
People are born with the natural rights to life, liberty, and
property, but in a state of nature, where they sit without organized
society, their lives are “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”2
To make life more sociable, rich, pleasant, peaceful, and long, people
sacrifice their natural rights as consideration for the social
contract.3 The social contract is an agreement to establish a

* Juris Doctor Candidate, UIC John Marshall Law School, Class of 2021.
This Comment is dedicated to patriots who, for the sake of liberty, fight.
1. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT & DISCOURSES 5
(G.D.H. Cole trans., London, Toronto, & New York, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. &
E.P. Dutton & Co. 1923) (1762).
2. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 269 (Thomas Hollis ed.,
London, A. Millar et al. 1764) (1689) (using “e[s]tate” to refer to property and
“property” to refer to natural rights); 1 CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON
DE LA BRÈDE ET DE MONTESQUIEU, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF M. DE
MONTESQUIEU 4-6 (London, T. Evans & W. Davis 1777) (1748) (theorizing that
peace, not war, first characterizes a state of nature); THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 97 (Clarendon Press 1909) (1651).
3. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 314-16; ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 14 (“But, as
men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones, they
have no other means of preserving themselves than the formulation, by
aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance.”). But
see Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted”
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 16-17 (2006) (rejecting social contract theory,
because natural rights are not sacrificed as consideration for the social contract,
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commonwealth to protect civil rights derived from those natural
rights.4 Generations following the founding generation implicitly
consent to be bound to the social contract by accepting the benefits
of the commonwealth, such as military protection, and having the
right to vote for representatives.5 The Constitution of the United
States is the social contract for the United States, and the People,
not the States, established that social contract.6 Citizens of the
United States benefit by participating in the construction of vague
provisions of the Constitution, such as through social activism.7
The origins of the Nondelegation Doctrine lie not in the
Constitution but in the social contract theory upon which the
Constitution was founded and is sustained, such as the Legislative
Vesting Clause.8 Separation of powers principles underlie those
but, instead, governmental legitimacy depends on laws proper in not violating
a person’s rights and necessary for protecting other people’s rights).
4. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 314-16.
5. See LOCKE, supra note 2, at 322 (justifying taxation); cf. AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 280-85 (Bob Loomis & Lara
Heimert eds. 2012) (proposing that constructions of vague constitutional
provisions concerning gender equality anterior to the Nineteenth Amendment
should prevail over constructions of vague constitutional provisions concerning
the same posterior to the Nineteenth Amendment, for popular sovereignty
legitimizes the former).
6. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 412, 428-29 (1819) (employing
structural reasoning to derive principles regarding the scope of federal power).
Contra 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL HISTORY: FROM
THE FOUNDING TO 1896, at 56-63 (Melvin I. Urofsky & Paul Finkelman eds., 3d
ed. 2008) (featuring the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, which Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison wrote respectively in opposition to four statutes:
Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798) (repealed by Act of April 14, 1802,
ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153); Aliens Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired June 25, 1800);
Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596
(1798) (expired Mar. 3, 1801) [collectively, “Alien and Sedition Acts”])
[hereinafter, “CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & HISTORY DOCUMENTS”]. The Kentucky
and Virginia Resolutions argued for compact theory, where the States, not the
People, established the Constitution, and therefore Congress had no power to
pass the Alien and Sedition Acts, the States retaining that power. Id.
7. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 74-81 (Elizabeth Knoll ed. 2011)
(describing Constitutional Redemption as a theory that the Constitution
contains many vague provisions, over which many people are enticed to
construe and through which thereby the grand constitutional scheme reinforces
popular sovereignty and itself).
8. Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 416-17 (2017) (“Unlike the U.S. Constitution,
most state constitutions make direct reference to the nondelegability of
legislative powers and do so in a number of ways.”); compare, e.g., PENN. CONST.
art. III, § 31 (prohibiting delegations of certain legislative powers “to any special
commission, private corporation[,] or association”), with U.S. CONST (lacking
any explicit references to limitations in delegations between branches of
government). But see Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1991)
(deriving the Nondelegation Doctrine from U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”)
[hereinafter, “Legislative Vesting Clause”]). The Legislative Vesting Clause
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origins, and the Nondelegation Doctrine theoretically prohibits
Congress from delegating legislative power to another branch to
reinforce those principles.9 The Supreme Court has developed three
tests to apply the Nondelegation Doctrine.10 They are the Panama
Refining Co. test, the Intelligible Principle test, and the American
Power & Light Co. test.11 The story goes, as it is often told, that the
New Deal ushered in an era of tremendous delegation of authority
from Congress to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.12 He sought to
expand the administrative state, but the stringent Panama
Refining Co. test invalidated two major sections of the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (“NIRA”) and threw a wrench into
those plans.13 However, whether resulting from political pressure
or otherwise, the more lenient Intelligible Principle and American
Power & Light Co. tests displaced the Panama Refining Co. test.14
The Court invalidated no other statutes or sections along
nondelegation grounds, and the administrative state ballooned.15
nominally tethers the Nondelegation Doctrine to the text of the Constitution,
but no nondelegation analysis actually directly derives from an interpretation
or construction of the text of the Legislative Vesting Clause, in contrast to other
constitutional law and its respective clauses. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621 (1991) (interpreting “seizure” of a person under U.S. CONST.
amend. IV to require a laying on of hands or a submission to a show of authority
and tethering thereby analysis to the actual words of the Constitution).
9. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) (“The
nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that
underlies our tripartite system of Government.”); MONTESQUIEU, supra note 2,
at 199 (“When the legi[s]lative and executive powers are united in the [s]ame
per[s]on, or in the [s]ame body of magi[s]trates, there can be no liberty[.]”).
10. Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 416-19 (1935) (the Panama Refining
Co. test); J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)
(the Intelligible Principle test); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105
(1946) (the American Power & Light Co. test).
11. See case cited supra note 10 (describing the three tests the Supreme
Court applies to the Nondelegation Doctrine).
12. See Michal R. Belknap, The New Deal and the Emergency Powers
Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REV. 67, 96-98 (1983) (discussing the general history of
nondelegation issues during the New Deal).
13. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 433; A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935); National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub.
L. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195; see, e.g., Thomas R. McCarthy & Richard W. Roberts, Jr.,
American Trucking Associations v. Environmental Protection Agency: In
Search and in Support of a Strong Nondelegation Doctrine, 23 WHITTIER L. REV.
137, 143-45 (2001) (discussing the “Strong Nondelegation Doctrine” that
invalidated the two sections); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 286 n.4
(1979) (discussing President Roosevelt’s “alphabet soup” of administrative
agencies).
14. McCarthy & Roberts, Jr., supra note 13, at 145-47; Elizabeth C. Price,
Constitutional Fidelity and the Commerce Clause: A Reply to Professor
Ackerman, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 160-63 (1998) (discussing a “switch in
time that saved nine”). But see Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 8, at 429-30
(concluding that the rigidity of the Panama Refining Co. test is more “mythical
than historical”).
15. McCarthy & Roberts, Jr., supra note 13, at 145-47; Price, supra note 14;
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Many people, particularly conservatives, have criticized the
administrative state.16 There has been extensive research as to
whether the Nondelegation Doctrine should be reinvigorated to
shrink the size of the administrative state (i.e., “big government”).17
Gundy v. United States portends to upend the Nondelegation
Doctrine by revitalizing the Panama Refining Co. test.18 It
foreshadows one of the most momentous legal paradigm shifts of
the twenty-first century. Justice Alito concurred with the plurality,
refusing to destabilize this regime without the collaboration of a
majority of the Court.19 That concurrence was, however, tenuous,
because Justice Alito expressed no administration for the plurality’s
actual rationale.20 Circumstances may have changed since then,
Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 8, at 429-30.
16. See, e.g., The EPA Is Earning a Reputation for Abuse, WASH. POST (May
3, 2012), www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-epa-is-earning-a-reputationfor-abuse/2012/05/03/gIQAucvzzT_story.html [perma.cc/XGT3-EMQ2] (noting
an EPA administrator resigned over comments that the EPA’s enforcement
policy was analogous to “ancient Roman soldiers’ practice of crucifying random
victims in recently conquered territory”); Heath C. Dejean, High-Stakes Word
Search: Ensuring Fair and Effective IRS Centralization in Tax Exemption, 75
LA. L. REV. 259, 260-62 (2014) (explaining the IRS’s Tea Party controversy, in
which people accused the IRS of treating applications for tax exemption
differently by reason of politics); and Eric Westervelt, For VA Whistleblowers, a
Culture
of
Fear
and
Retaliation,
NPR
(June
21,
2018),
www.npr.org/2018/06/21/601127245/for-va-whistleblowers-a-culture-of-fearand-retaliation [perma.cc/3HNY-A7X7] (detailing rampant corruption in the
United States Department of Veterans Affairs and efforts to retaliate against
whistleblowers).
17. For example, Professor Keith E. Whittington and Associate Research
Scholar Jason Iuliano released a groundbreaking study analyzing 2,506 cases
of States applying the Nondelegation Doctrine. Whittington & Iuliano, supra
note 8, at 418.
18. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
For two decades, no one thought to invoke the ‘intelligible principle’
comment as a basis to uphold a statute that would have failed more
traditional separation-of-powers tests . . . until the late 1940s. Only then
did lawyers begin digging it up in earnest and arguing to this Court that
it had somehow displaced (sub silentio of course) all prior teachings in
this area.
Id.
19. Id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“But Justice Alito supplies the fifth
vote for today’s judgment and he does not join either the plurality’s
constitutional or statutory analysis, indicating instead that he remains willing,
in a future case with a full Court, to revisit these matters. Respectfully, I would
not wait.”); id. at 2130-31 (Alito, J., concurring) (“But because a majority is not
willing to do that, it would be freakish to single out the provision at issue here
for special treatment.”). Justice Kavanaugh had not heard the oral arguments
in this case and therefore recused himself. Nicholas Bagley, On Gundy and the
Nondelegation
Doctrine,
YALE J. ON REG. (June
21,
2009).
www.yalejreg.com/nc/12261-2 [perma.cc/RU5M-2968].
20. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130-31 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Nevertheless, since

2020]

Deus Ex Regula

1051

with Justice Kavanaugh taking his seat,21 and with Justice Barrett
taking her seat.22 This Comment will argue that the Panama
Refining Co. test will not satisfy conservatives’ hopes and desires of
“shrinking the size of big government.”23 After all, at the outset,
that test is a sheep in wolf’s clothing. Liberals should also have an
interest in legitimizing the administrative state, for rubberstamping Congressional delegations does not inspire trust in the
People that the separation of powers principles are being respected.
In Part II, this Comment will describe the history of the
Nondelegation Doctrine. That history will demonstrate that the
tests are inadequate to meet today’s challenges regarding the
administrative state. In Part III, this Comment will derive new
rules for the Nondelegation Doctrine. Finally, in Part IV, this
Comment will propose which existing rules should be retained and
which new rules should be adopted. Then, it will synthesize these
rules into a new test. That test will be based upon a specific theory
of the Nondelegation Doctrine applicable to Congressional
delegations to the President and his or her agents in the
administrative state.

II. BACKGROUND
Administrative law may be best conceptualized as partitioned
into ex ante (“out of the before”) and ex post (“out of the after”)
administrative law.24 The Nondelegation Doctrine squarely fits into
ex ante administrative law, because whether a statute violates the
1935, the Court has uniformly rejected nondelegation arguments and has
upheld provisions that authorized agencies to adopt important rules pursuant
to extraordinarily capacious standards.” (emphasis added)).
21. United States v. Paul, 718 F. App’x. 360 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No.
17-8830, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 7194 (U.S. Nov. 25, 2019) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (praising Justice Gorsuch’s research regarding the Nondelegation
Doctrine in Gundy and discussing the Major Questions Doctrine).
22. Steve Holland, U.S. Supreme Court Nominee Barrett Pledges to Follow
Law, Not Personal Views, REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2020), www.reuters.com/article/ususa-court-barrett-statement/u-s-supreme-court-nominee-barrett-pledges-tofollow-law-not-personal-views-idUSKBN26W0MM
[perma.cc/D3FL-4S3J].
Justice Gorsuch seems to suggest that the Intelligible Principle test has been
propped up at least by some judicial and scholarly bias. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at
2138-40 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Whether Justice Barrett agrees, or how
Justice Barrett will rule as a jurist on the high court, is not precisely known at
the time of the writing of this Comment.
23. Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 8, at 405, 429-31 (suggesting that the
two sections of the NIRA were invalidated because they were anomalously
improper legislation and that reverting back to the Panama Refining Co. test
would not have that much bite in regular cases).
24. Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex
Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1141 (2013) (explaining that
Swedish economist and sociologist Gunnar Myrdal defined ex ante (i.e., “out of
the before”) as what is planned and ex post (i.e., “out of the after”) as what
actually happens).
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Nondelegation Doctrine should be ascertainable at the statute’s
passage.25 The Panama Refining Co. test synthesized much of the
development of the Nondelegation Doctrine from the ratification of
the Constitution to the New Deal.26 The background of the
Nondelegation Doctrine during that time period will demonstrate
that it is fundamentally weak, and the Panama Refining Co. test’s
mythical stature as a tough test consequently will be demonstrated
as unfounded. Moreover, the background of the Nondelegation
Doctrine after the New Deal will demonstrate that Nondelegation
Doctrine as ex ante administrative law weakened as ex post
administrative law strengthened.

A. The Nondelegation Doctrine pre-New Deal: We
Didn’t Start the Fire
The incomparable philosopher John Locke’s influence on the
Founding Fathers cannot be understated.27 He was the first to
propose delegata potestas non potest delegari, meaning “A delegated
power cannot be delegated.”28 That proposition lays the foundation
for the separation of powers principles upon which the
Nondelegation Doctrine relies.29 The Constitution delegates all
25. This result follows logically. However an agent exercises a
Congressionally delegated power, that exercise does not by itself cause Congress
to change the power already delegated. To see how this result comports with
precedent, see, for example, A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 537
(“But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its
legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to
empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the
rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries?”). If the
Nondelegation Doctrine were ex post administrative law, then the Court could
logically wait and see whether those business associations do exercise
impermissibly delegated powers. Here, however, the delegation was void ab
initio. Id.
26. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 421-30 (explaining the history on the
Nondelegation Doctrine up to that point and how the case law demonstrates
that “there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to
transcend” and formalizing those limits into a test).
27. Susan Henderson-Utis, What Would the Founding Fathers Do? The Rise
of Religious Programs in the United States Prison System, 52 HOW. L.J. 459,
464 (2009) (“John Locke influenced the Founding Fathers perhaps more than
any other philosopher from the Enlightenment.”); John L. Watts, Tyranny by
Proxy: State Action and the Private Use of Deadly Force, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1237, 1267 n.202 (2014) (“So great was Locke's influence on Jefferson that he
considered Locke to be one of the three greatest men in history.”).
28. Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of
Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 125 (2011) (translating
delegata potestas non potest delegari).
29. John Locke submits:
The legi[s]lative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other
hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have
it cannot pa[s]s it over to others. . . . And when the people have [s]aid,
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legislative power to Congress, but Congress may “make all laws
necessary and proper” to execute those delegated legislative
powers.30
In 1813, the Supreme Court, in Cargo of the Brig Aurora v.
United States, confronted sui generis whether Congress had
delegated its legislative power to the President in contravention of
delegata potestas non potest delegari.31 This case arose after the
expiration of the Non-Intercourse Act (“NIA”).32 Prior to the War of
1812, the NIA embargoed Great Britain and France for
commandeering American sailors, but then the NIA expired.33
Congress passed a statute that empowered the President to revive
the NIA by proclaiming that France did not change her policies.34
The President could do the same if Great Britain did not change her
policies as well.35 Thus, Congress conditioned the revival of the NIA
on Presidential action.36 Without explanation, the Court held there
was “no sufficient reason[] why the legislature [could] not exercise
its discretion in reviving the act of . . . 1809 . . . conditionally. . . .”37
Twelve years after Cargo of the Brig Aurora in Wayman v.
Southard, Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for a unanimous
Court, better explained the Court’s reasoning when confronting
issues of delegation.38 The issue was whether Congress could
delegate its power to amend and supplement procedural rules to

We will [s]ubmit to rules, and be governed by laws made by [s]uch men,
and in [s]uch forms, no body el[s]e can [s]ay other men [s]hall make laws
for them[.]
LOCKE, supra note 2, at 322-23.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States[.]”); id., § 8.
31. Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. 382, 388 (1813). If the
People delegated legislative power to Congress and if delegata potestas non
potest delegari were purely applied, Congress can delegate legislative power to
no other entity. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (introducing
delegata potestas non potest delegari).
32. Non-Intercourse Act, Pub. L. No. 10-24, 2 Stat. 528 (1809).
33. Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War,
97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1291-92 (2009) (discussing much of the history behind
Congressional response towards the hostilities with Great Britain and France).
34. Act of Mar. 2, 1811, ch. 29, § 3, 2 Stat. 651, 651 (making the NonIntercourse Act’s revival contingent on Presidential proclamation); Keith E.
Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J.
1257, 1291 (2009) (describing contextual matters, such as how the NonIntercourse Act superseded the unpopular Embargo Act of 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat.
451, which embargoed all naval trade).
35. § 3, 2 Stat. at 651.
36. Jennifer L. Mascott, Developments: Gundy v. United States: Reflections
on the Court and the State of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 26 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1, 16-17 (2018) (“So, Congress legislated the conditions under which trade
restrictions were to remain in effect; the Executive just evaluated factually
whether such considerations continued to exist”).
37. Cargo of the Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. at 388.
38. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825).
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federal courts, to whom those procedural rules would apply.39 The
Court held that Congress could and distinguished between “strictly
and exclusively legislative powers” and those powers over minor
details in which others, like courts, might fill.40 The Court therefore
sub silentio rejects delegata potestas non potest delegari.41 Those
powers over minor details are intermixed with legislative powers,
but the principle on its face does not admit of any such delegation,
whatever the mixture.42
Over half a century later, three seminal cases outlined in more
detail the Nondelegation Doctrine of the United States before the
New Deal.43 They are Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, Mahler v. Eby,
39. Id. at 42-43; see also Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially
Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405,
413-14 (2008) (describing other contextual matters, such as how the “Judiciary
Act had empowered the judiciary to . . . ‘establish all necessary rules for the
orderly conducting [of] business in the . . . courts’” and how the “Process Act
required federal courts in common law actions to apply the procedural rules
that existed as of 1789 in the states in which they sat,” subject to the federal
courts’ supplement).
40. Wayman, 23 U.S. at 42-43, 45 (concluding that “Congress may certainly
delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself”).
41. See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 8, at 408 (explaining how the
Michigan Supreme Court reasons that delegata postestas non potest delegari is
not a blanket prohibition, because the nature of legislative power lends itself to
delegation in at least some cases, implying therefore that it is legislative power
being delegated). But see Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 8, at 399 (stating
that “executive officers ‘did not legislate’ so long as they ‘did not go outside of
the circle of that which the act itself had affirmatively required to be done, or
treated as unlawful if done.’” (quoting United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506,
518 (1911)).
42. Resolution of this issue over whether legislative or non-legislative power
is being delegated could reconcile the seemingly inconsistent application of
delegata potestas non potest delegari. See, e.g., J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276
U.S. at 407 (distinguishing legislative power and executive power on the basis
of legislative power involving a decision of what the law should be and therefore
implying that delegations are of a non-legislative nature). If that maxim only
applies to legislative power, but the legislature delegates duties and
responsibilities to officials under those officials’ own inherent powers, like
executive powers, there would be no contradiction. Id. The reason is that powers
are not being re-delegated. Id. The legislature is simply exercising its legislative
powers and compelling officials under their own inherent powers to enact those
laws. Id. However, that formulation contains its own separation of powers
issues or may not fall under the Nondelegation Doctrine at all. Id.
43. The three cases are not intended to be collectively exhaustive, as the
Nondelegation Doctrine has a tremendous quantity of case law. See, e.g., Steven
F. Huefner, The Supreme Court’s Avoidance of the Nondelegation Doctrine in
Clinton v. City of New York: More than “A Dime’s Worth of Difference”, 49 CATH.
U.L. REV. 337, 348-50 (2000) (choosing to discuss in its recounting of the history
of the Nondelegation Doctrine Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904)). But
see Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 8, at 396 (explaining that “[t]he Court
had remarkably little to say regarding the delegation of legislative power from
the late Marshall Court through the remainder of the nineteenth century.”); id.
at 396 n.109 (discussing how the Court greenlighted States’ delegation of
eminent domain to railroad businesses).
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and J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States.44
First, in Marshall Field & Co., the Court confronted whether
Congress may condition tariffs on imports of “sugars, molasses,
coffee, tea[,] and hides” on a Presidential finding.45 Specifically,
Congress wanted to incentivize reciprocal trade by only imposing
tariffs against foreign nations upon a Presidential finding that
those nations have imposed tariffs on the exports of those same
products.46 “The President had ‘no discretion,’ but merely
‘ascertained the existence of a particular fact’ that Congress had
specified as necessary to trigger [the tariff].”47 However, the
President did exercise some discretion, such as that relating to the
duration of the tariff.48 The distinction is that this discretion was
not something that Congress conferred: it was inherent in the
President’s executory power.49 Nonetheless, Congress itself
declared the policy of incentivizing reciprocal trade and explicitly
limited the President’s discretion in his fact-finding mission.50 That
fact led the Court to hold that this was a permissible delegation of
legislative power.51
Second, in Mahler, the Court confronted whether Congress
impermissibly delegated legislative power to the Secretary of Labor
by allowing him to deport aliens found to be “undesirable
residents.”52 Unlike Marshall Field & Co., where there were explicit
limits to the President’s discretion, none existed here.53 Rather, the
Court held that the “common understanding” afforded to
“undesirable residents” was sufficient to limit the discretion of the

44. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Mahler v. Eby, 264
U.S. 32 (1924); J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. 394.
45. Marshall Field & Co., 143 U.S. at 680.
46. Id.
47. Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 8, at 397 (quoting Marshall Field &
Co., 143 U.S. at 693).
48. Cf. Marshall Field & Co., 143 U.S. at 693 (stating that such discretion
related to enforcement and that it was of a different nature than any power
Congress could delegate); id. (implying therefore that that discretion did not
create nondelegation issues).
49. Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 8, at 399 (“[E]xecutive officers ‘did not
legislate’ so long as they ‘did not go outside of the circle of that which the act
itself had affirmatively required to be done, or treated as unlawful if done.’”
(quoting Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 518)).
50. Marshall Field & Co., 143 U.S. at 692-93.
51. Id.
52. Mahler, 264 U.S. at 40. The Court also confronted whether Congress
enacted an ex post facto law by increasing the “punishment” for crimes aliens
already had committed and been punished. Id. at 38-40 (holding that
deportation is not a punishment because it goes to fundamental sovereign
powers and that therefore there was no ex post facto law).
53. Marshall Field & Co., 143 U.S. at 693; Huefner, supra note 43 (“[The
power to exclude immigrants deemed undesirable] was a wide and powerful
discretionary authority, upheld because of the Court's willingness to trust that
the Secretary shared, and would adhere to, this ‘common understanding’”).
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Secretary of Labor.54 In addition, the Court viewed deportation as
an irreducibly political question.55 Although Mahler features
similarities with past cases, it also markedly differs from them
because the Secretary of Labor’s fact-finding mission was to
determine whether an alien was an “undesirable resident.”56 This
seems on its face to be more opinion than fact.57
Finally, in the landmark case J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., Chief
Justice and former President William Howard Taft wrote for a
unanimous Court confronting whether Congress impermissibly
delegated its power to the President.58 Specifically, the power was
to modify tariffs on products imported from competing foreign
countries that were found to have production costs lower than those
in the United States.59 As the Nondelegation Doctrine developed,
two relevant factors in deciding whether a Congressional delegation
is permissible are whether Congress has declared the policy and
whether it has imposed limitations on the agent’s discretion.60 In J.
W. Hampton, Jr., & Co.,
Congress declared the policy of
equalization, and the President’s discretion was limited in one of
two ways.61 First, the clarity of the policy itself constrained any factfinding or Presidential action to it.62 Second, in the alternative,
there were procedural safeguards of notice and hearing for the
54. Mahler, 264 U.S. at 40.
55. Id. But see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165-66 (1803) (recognizing
that the President does have discretionary political power but that the law is
concerned when rights become vested); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & HISTORY
DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 176-78 (containing and discussing Stuart v. Laird,
5 U.S. 299 (1803)). There, a judgment was entered in favor of the respondent in
a court that the Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, established but was
abolished by the Judiciary Act of 1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW & HISTORY DOCUMENTS, supra note 6, at 176-78. Chief Justice Marshall
rode circuit thereafter to affirm the judgment, and the Court held that it was in
Congress’ discretion to abolish federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
transfer caseloads. Id.
56. Compare Mahler, 264 U.S. at 40 (conditioning deportation upon the
Secretary of Labor’s finding that an alien is an “undesirable resident”), with
Cargo of the Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. at 388 (conditioning Presidential power upon
a determination of whether Great Britain or France had ceased performing
certain conduct regarding trade, which determination seeming to have more of
a “factual” character to it).
57. See cases cited supra note 56 (comparing Mahler, 264 U.S. at 40 with
Cargo of the Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. at 388).
58. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 400-01, 413 (“Section 315 and its
provisions are within the power of Congress”).
59. Id. at 400-01.
60. E.g., Marshall Field & Co., 143 U.S. at 692-93 (noting that advanced
prescription of duties on designated products go to Congress’ determination of
policy).
61. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 404-05.
62. Id. (suggesting that whether a disparity existed between the United
States’ production costs and a foreign nation’s left little room for objective
dispute and noting that the statute required reevaluations of these disparities
“from time to time”).
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Tariff Commission, which assisted the President’s fact-finding
mission.63 The Court’s analysis has proceeded as one would expect
from prior precedent thus far, but the Court next stated: “If
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle
to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed
to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power.”64 Prior to J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., patterns of
analysis were emerging, and Chief Justice Taft attempted to
summarize those patterns through the phrase “intelligible
principle.”65 That one phrase will be a flashpoint in the
Nondelegation Doctrine.66
In terms of the strength of the Nondelegation Doctrine as
originally understood, it never actually invalidated a statute during
this time period.67 The States did invalidate some of their statutes
along nondelegation grounds with more detailed reasoning, but the
States’ Nondelegation Doctrine was no juggernaut either.68 That
was all changed after the New Deal, a period between 1933 to 1936
when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt attempted to reform

63. Id.
64. Id. at 409; Meaghan Dunigan, The Intelligible Principle: How It Briefly
Lived, Why It Died, and Why It Desperately Needs Revival in Today’s
Administrative State, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 247, 254-55 (2017) (“The intelligible
principle was first articulated in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States.”).
65. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409.
66. In Justice Gorsuch’s words:
No one at the time thought the phrase meant to effect some revolution
in this Court’s understanding of the Constitution. While the exact line
between policy and details, lawmaking and fact-finding, and legislative
and non-legislative functions had sometimes invited reasonable debate,
everyone agreed these were the relevant inquiries. And when Chief
Justice Taft wrote of an “intelligible principle,” it seems plain enough
that he sought only to explain the operation of these traditional tests; he
gave no hint of a wish to overrule or revise them. Tellingly, too, he wrote
the phrase seven years before Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining,
and it did nothing to alter the analysis in those cases, let alone prevent
those challenges from succeeding by lopsided votes.
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
67. Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 8, at 402.
68. Id. at 405-17 (discovering that States in a nondelegation analysis
considered whether legislatures transferred “controlling power,” whether the
agents were qualified, or whether legislatures were abdicating responsibility or
electoral accountability). However, the States are nevertheless excellent
sources for comparison with the federal government on the Nondelegation
Doctrine because all States must have republican forms of government, and
therefore their form of government is much more similar to the federal
government than most foreign states. See, e.g., Nanping Liu & Michelle Liu,
Justice Without Judges: The Case Filling Division in the People’s Republic of
China, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 283, 318-19 (2011) (describing how
Chinese administrative law works and how alien it may seem when compared
to United States administrative law).

1058

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:705

social and economic policies following the Great Depression.69

B. The Nondelegation Doctrine during the New Deal
In 1935, the Court developed and applied a test from Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan when it confronted whether Congress
impermissibly delegated powers to the President by passing Title I
of the National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”), which allowed the
President to prohibit interstate and foreign transfers of hot oil.70
Hot oil is oil in volumes exceeding state quotas, arguably affecting
interstate commerce, and the President issued Executive Orders
prohibiting the same.71 In order for a delegation to be valid,
Congress must (1) declare a policy with respect to the subject
matter, (2) set up a standard for the agent’s actions, and (3) require
a finding by the agent in the exercise of authority to enact the law.72
Unlike many of the other statutes discussed, NIRA and other
similar statutes passed during the beginning of President
Roosevelt’s administration were quite hastily written.73 The Court
held that not all the elements of the Nondelegation Doctrine were
satisfied.74 The Court, therefore, invalidated the Executive Orders
and implicitly the relevant portions of NIRA along nondelegation
grounds.75
That same year, in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, the Court also addressed another nondelegation issue as to

69. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1933 Inauguration, YOUTUBE, www.youtu
be.com/watch?v=MX_v0zxM23Q [perma.cc/4L4G-W6L3] (last visited Nov. 1,
2019).
70. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 405-10; National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195.
71. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 405-10.
72. Id. at 416-19. But see Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136-37 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (combining the second and third elements, maintaining the first
element, but adding another element for assignments of non-legislative
responsibilities, such as powers inherent to other branches, like the President’s
powers over foreign policy).
73. Valerie A. Sanchez, A New Look at ADR in New Deal Labor Law
Enforcement: The Emergence of a Dispute Processing Continuum Under the
Wagner Act, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 621, 630 n.18 (2005) (explaining
that there was a rush in legislating that the Great Depression caused and that
this haste might have lowered the quality of statutes passed); see also Bruce E.
Kaufman, Does the NLRA Constrain Employee Involvement and Participation
Programs in Nonunion Companies?: A Reassessment, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
729, 738 (1999) (characterizing President Roosevelt’s economic programs as
“hastily conceived”).
74. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 418 (demonstrating that (1) was not satisfied,
because Congress declared a policy in general but not specifically with respect
to hot oil, whose definition was itself dependent upon state law and not an Act
of Congress); id. at 418-19 (demonstrating that (2) and (3) were not satisfied,
because the President did not conduct a fact-finding mission in the oil industry,
and his discretion was not limited).
75. See Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 418.

2020]

Deus Ex Regula

1059

whether a company could be convicted of violating a Live Poultry
Code.76 The President certified business leaders as “impos[ing] no
inequitable restrictions on admission to membership” and being
“truly representative”; consequently, the business leaders
promulgated the Live Poultry Code.77 The Court applied the
Panama Refining Co. test and held that even though Congress had
declared a policy, it had nevertheless impermissibly delegated
legislative power by violating the second and third elements.78
Frustrated by these key sections of the NIRA being
invalidated, President Roosevelt infamously threatened to pack the
Supreme Court with younger judges who would presumably be
more sympathetic with the New Deal agenda.79 The public reaction
was intensely negative and this court-packing scheme failed, but
Justice Roberts switched from tending to oppose to tending to
support New Deal legislation.80 This “switch in time that saved
nine” might not actually have been primarily motivated by
politics.81 Regardless of the motivation, it certainly made a fine
difference with regards to the development of the Nondelegation
Doctrine.

76. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 537-38.
77. Id. (noting that familiarity with an industry or expertise does not justify
constituting those familiar into a secondary legislature).
78. Id. at 538-40 (holding that (2) the standards were inadequate because
they only limit the President in choosing the business leaders and not in
promulgating the “code of fair competition” itself and that (3) a fact-finding
mission as broad as ensuring that the business leaders refrain from
monopolistic practices procures no positive fact-finding mission with adequate
limits to Presidential discretion); see also Arthur B. Mark, III, Annual Survey
of the United States Supreme Court and Federal Law: Casenotes United States
v. Morrison, the Commerce Clause and the Substantial Effects Test: No
Substantial Limit on Federal Power, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 675, 709-10 (2001)
( stating: “Chief Justice Charles Hughes, writing for the Court, reasoned first
that the codes authorized under the NIRA were law and not rules because the
codes place individuals under a duty to act or refrain from acting and imposed
criminal penalties for violating the codes' provisions.”). The Court also
invalidated the statute along interstate commerce grounds. A. L. A. Schechter
Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 542-50 (observing that much of New York’s poultry
gets transported from out-of-State, but the regulated actions concerning the
preparation and selling of poultry all occur intrastate); id. (recognizing that
these regulated actions do not directly cause an adverse effect upon interstate
commerce); see also Rebecca E. Hatch, The Violence Against Women Act:
Surviving the Substantial Effects of United States v. Lopez, 31 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 423, 430 n.41 (1997) (discussing the interstate commerce grounds
involving the NIRA).
79. Elizabeth L. Robinson, Revival of Roosevelt: Analyzing Expansion of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in Light of the Resurgence of State “CourtPacking” Plans, 96 N.C.L. REV. 1126, 1133-36 (2018).
80. Id.
81. Samuel R. Olken, Historical Revisionism and Constitutional Change:
Understanding the New Deal Court, 88 VA. L. REV. 265, 269-72, 290-94 (2002)
(disagreeing with the conventional story that the Court’s changes in position
were due to political pressure).
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Yakus v. United States was a part of that switch in time and
marked a paradigm shift of the Court for the Nondelegation
Doctrine.82 As World War II raged, President Roosevelt and his
majority in Congress attempted to control inflation with the
Emergency Price Control Act (“EPCA”), which permitted the Office
of Price Administration (“OPA”), an administrative agency under
the direction of the President, to regulate the price of meat.83 The
genius of EPCA was that OPA could regulate the price of wholesale
or retail meat, but not the price of the actual livestock.84
Accordingly, the price of livestock rose, and meat packers, with no
control over the price of livestock, had to pay the farmers selling the
livestock to them (probably at market value) and stay in business
without contravening OPA’s mandates.85 Albert Yakus, “a highly
respected member of the local community and leader of his
synagogue,” believed this to be an impossible task for his meatpacking business, increased his wholesale and retail meat prices in
contravention of OPA’s mandates, and earned himself a criminal
record.86
Whatever might have been the wisdom of EPCA or OPA’s
agency actions, the Court did analyze the nondelegation issue
through the Panama Refining Co. test and held that all the
elements were satisfied.87 In addition, Chief Justice Stone made
this architectonic observation:
The Constitution . . . does not demand the impossible or the
impracticable. It does not require that Congress find for itself every
fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make
for itself detailed determinations which it has declared to be
prerequisite to the application of the legislative policy to particular
facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to
investigate.88

C. The Nondelegation Doctrine and Other
Administrative Law post-New Deal
It might seem as though the Nondelegation Doctrine was
weakened after Yakus. For people who continued to seek a strong

82. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
83. James R. Conde & Michael S. Grieve, Yakus and the Administrative
State, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 809, 824-25 (2019); Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23.
84. Conde & Grieve, supra note 83, at 809.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 809-10.
87. Yakus, 31 U.S. at 423, 425-26 (“It is enough to satisfy the statutory
requirements . . . that the prices fixed will tend to achieve that objective and
will conform to those standards, and that the courts in an appropriate
proceeding can see that substantial basis for those findings is not wanting”).
88. Id. at 424.
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Nondelegation Doctrine, however, to say that that quest suffered a
major setback after American Power & Light Co. v. SEC would be
an understatement.89 The Electric Bond and Share Company
holding system consisted of three tiers: first, the Electric Bond and
Share Company; second, five subholding companies including the
defendants; and, finally, “237 direct and indirect subsidiaries.”90
This structure made it difficult for minority shareholders to
influence boards of directors in the holding system.91 In 1935,
Congress passed the Public Utility Holding Company Act
(“PUHCA”) to break apart these concentrations of power.92 In a
similar vein to Mahler, PUHCA applied to “holding companies,”
“subsidiaries,” or “affiliates” but permitted the SEC to interpret
what those terms meant.93 The SEC tackled holding systems that
“unduly or unnecessarily complicate[d] the structure or unfairly or
inequitably distribute[d] voting power” pursuant to Section 11(b)(2)
of PUHCA and sought dissolution of the petitioners.94 Here, the
Court reasons that a delegation is good if “Congress clearly
delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it,
and the boundaries of this delegated authority” and held that the
Nondelegation Doctrine had not been violated.95 The American
Power & Light Co. test has received criticism, whether rightly or
wrongly, but it is plainly a diminution of the Panama Refining Co.
test, because it sets the bar so low for Congress to make a proper
delegation.96 Thus was born the Panama Refining Co. test, the
Intelligible Principle test, and the American Power & Light Co. test,
and thusly did the latter two bury the former summarily.97
89. Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. 90.
90. Id. at 95-96.
91. Id. at 96 (“After appropriate notice and hearing, the Commission found
that the corporate structure and continued existence of American and Electric
unduly and unnecessarily complicated the Bond and Share system and unfairly
and inequitably distributed voting power among the security holders of that
system[.]”).
92. Public Utility Company Holding Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79-79(z)-6
(2000), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16451-16463 (2018);
Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a Model for
Breaking up the Banks that Are Too-Big-to-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 821, 850-55
(2011) (discussing the origins and purposes of PUHCA).
93. Karmel, supra note 92, at 851.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 79(b)-2 (2018); Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 96;
Andrew Dudley, Opening Borders: Congressional Delegation of Discretionary
Authority to Suspend or Repeal the Laws of the United States, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
273, 299-300 (2009) (characterizing the delegation as “quasi-legislative”).
95. Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 105.
96. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 370
n.170 (2002) (being skeptical of whether the statute’s background and context
adequately limits the SEC’s discretion).
97. See, e.g., Chapman v. US Commodity Futures Trading Co., 788 F.2d 408,
411 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that an administrative law judge’s harsh sanctions
against a party were within statutory limits, implying consequently that the
state’s delegation of power to the administrative law judge passed the broad
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Now, in 1989, much later than the aforementioned cases,
Mistretta v. United States quintessentially represents how the
Nondelegation Doctrine functions presently.98 It concerned whether
Congress impermissibly delegated legislative power to the United
States Sentencing Commission (“Sentencing Commission”) to
promulgate Sentencing Guidelines.99 The Sentencing Commission
was composed of three Article III judges the President appointed
and four nonjudicial members.100 The Sentencing Guidelines sought
to promote more consistent sentencing and bound trial judges in
their discretion at sentencing.101 The Court applied the Intelligible
Principle and the American Power & Light Co. tests, which were
satisfied, and merely noted that Panama Refining Co. and A. L. A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. were the only times the Court had
invalidated a statute along nondelegation grounds and that it had
not done so since, without applying the Panama Refining Co. test.102
This analysis has stood relatively undisturbed – that is, until
Gundy v. United States.103
In 2006, Congress had established “a comprehensive, national
sex offender registration system” through the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) to combat “potential
gaps and loopholes” in the previous laws offering offenders
refuge.104 Congress delegated the Attorney General to decide
American Power & Light Co. test, and determining that the decision therefore
could only be disturbed upon a showing of abuse of discretion); United States v.
Hickernell, 690 F. Supp. 272, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying the Intelligible
Principle test and holding that Congress had not impermissibly delegated
legislative power to the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (2018), where the defendant
pled guilty to crimes and was sentenced in accordance with guidelines the
Sentencing Commission promulgated).
98. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361.
99. Id. at 362-63.
100. Id. at 384-408 (explaining the composition of the Sentencing
Commission, the general purposes behind the Sentencing Guidelines, and the
numerous arguments advanced against the Sentencing Guidelines along
nondelegation and other separation of powers grounds and rejecting the
argument that mixing Article III judges with nonjudicial members would
deprive the judicial branch of its independence, because the Article III judges
are not conscripted to serve on the Sentencing Commission, and trial judges
regularly make decisions regarding sentencing anyways); Id. at 413 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“While the products of the Sentencing Commission's labors have
been given the modest name ‘Guidelines,’ . . . they have the force and effect of
laws, prescribing the sentences criminal defendants are to receive. A judge who
disregards them will be reversed”).
101. Id. at 384-408.
102. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-78.
103. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121-30 (proceeding along the same analysis
as Mistretta with applications of the Intelligible Principle and American Power
& Light Co. tests, except that the Court construed an ambiguous provision too).
104. 34 U.S.C. § 20911-32 (2018); Steven J. Grocki, Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, www.
justice.gov/criminal-ceos/sex-offender-registration-and-notification-act-sorna
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whether SORNA should apply to sex offenders convicted before the
passage of SORNA (“pre-enactment sex offenders”).105 The Supreme
Court confronted whether Congress had impermissibly delegated to
the Attorney General legislative power that led to the conviction of
Herman Gundy, a pre-enactment offender.106 The most poignant
moment during the oral arguments came when Justice Breyer
paraphrased the petitioner’s argument regarding delegating power
for criminal statutes to the United States Department of Justice:
And there is a particular danger when you combine prosecuting a
person with the writing of the law under which you prosecute. And
the danger is captured in the bill of attainder clause. It's captured
maybe in [the] ex post facto clause. It's captured in the word “liberty.”
And it is that particular danger that means where you have a person
whose job is prosecuting, be careful, especially careful, that that
person cannot also write the law under which he prosecutes. Because
there we risk vendetta.107

Although none of the opinions focused on the unique
circumstances posed from a delegation of SORNA rulemaking to the
chief prosecutor, the United States having a “government of laws
and not men” implies that there should be some daylight between
creation and execution of the criminal law.108 Under the Intelligible
Principle and American Power & Light Co. tests, these
considerations fall by the wayside, and the majority had no trouble
upholding the delegation.109 Justice Gorsuch, writing for the
dissent, argued that the Nondelegation Doctrine has been diluted
[perma.cc/CYK9-FFS7] (last updated Mar. 6, 2018); see also MARIEL ALPER &
MATTHEW R. DUROSE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM STATE
PRISON: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP (2005-14), at 5 (2019), www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/rsorsp9yfu0514.pdf
[perma.cc/38V6-MNK7] (“Overall, prisoners
released after serving time for rape or sexual assault (7.7%) were more than
three times as likely as other released prisoners (2.3%) to be arrested for rape
or sexual assault during the 9 years following release.”). But see Wendy Sawyer,
BJS Fuels Myths About Sex Offense Recidivism, Contradicting its Own New
Data,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(June
6,
2019),
www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/06/06/sexoffenses/
[perma.cc/PV26-S4CZ]
(stating: “What the report doesn’t say is that the same comparisons can be made
for the other offense categories: People released from sentences for homicide
were more than twice as likely to be rearrested for a homicide[, and] those who
served sentences for robbery were more than twice as likely to be rearrested for
robbery.”). For constitutional arguments against SORNA, see Jesse Kelley, The
Sex Offender Registry: Vengeful, Unconstitutional and Due for Full Repeal, HILL
(Mar. 5, 2018), www.thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/376668-the-sexoffender-registry-vengeful-unconstitutional-and-due-for-full [perma.cc/889LSRPG] (arguing that SORNA violates the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments).
105. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d).
106. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122.
107. Oral Argument at 37:01, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086),
www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-6086 [perma.cc/W44A-DZWS].
108. Marbury, 5 U.S, at 163.
109. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129.
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through the Intelligible Principle test because of an imprecise
summarization, and the Court should return to the Panama
Refining Co. test to revitalize the Nondelegation Doctrine.110
Applying the Panama Refining Co. test, Justice Gorsuch
characterized Congress as delegating to the Attorney General the
ultimate policy-making decision as to whether SORNA should apply
to pre-enactment sex offenders, and therefore Congress could not
have declared a policy with respect to this subject-matter.111 By
contrast, the Court actually did argue that this delegation would
have passed muster under the Panama Refining Co. test by
characterizing Congress as delegating to the Attorney General only
discretion relating to whether SORNA would feasibly apply to preenactment sex offenders.112
And so the story of the Nondelegation Doctrine has been told,
or has it? The Nondelegation Doctrine should be understood in the
larger context of administrative law. In the same year as Panama
Refining Co., the Court held in Humphrey’s Executor v. United
States that Congress may require that the President only remove
officers in agencies for cause, if those agencies are not wholly within
the executive branch.113 This is the only other ex ante
administrative law principle relevant to the Comment. Finally, ex
post administrative law is a world unto itself, and that body of law
has largely developed, ironically enough, because the
Nondelegation Doctrine has weakened, but administrative agencies
must nevertheless be checked and balanced.114 It is beyond the
110. Id. at 2139.
111. Id. at 2143 (concluding also that Congress has assigned no fact-finding
mission and acknowledging that one method by which this method could have
been satisfied would be for Congress to have declared that SORNA applies to
all pre-enactment sex offenders, but the Attorney General may exempt certain
individuals on a case-by-case basis according to guidelines).
112. Id. at 2128-30 (construing SORNA in such a manner as to conclude that
Congress actually had made the decision to apply SORNA to pre-enactment sex
offenders in general but left to the Attorney General the decision as to which
pre-enactment sex offenders SORNA should apply in accordance with feasibility
constraints, which the Attorney General must determine on a case-by-case
basis).
113. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935).
114. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141-42 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
While it’s been some time since the Court last held that a statute
improperly delegated the legislative power to another branch—thanks
in no small measure to the intelligible principle misadventure—the
Court has hardly abandoned the business of policing improper legislative
delegations. When one legal doctrine becomes unavailable to do its
intended work, the hydraulic pressures of our constitutional system
sometimes shift the responsibility to different doctrines.
Id.
Ex post administrative law is logically not applicable to the Nondelegation
Doctrine, because whether the Nondelegation Doctrine has been violated must
be ascertainable at the time of a statute’s passage. Cf. PETER T. WENDEL, A
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scope of this Comment to review ex post administrative law, but the
Administrative Procedure Act is a significant source of limitations
on agency action.115

III. ANALYSIS
Analysis of the Nondelegation Doctrine requires consideration
of law most fundamental to our system of government.116 This
section will show that original methods, precedent, structural
reasoning, and Living Originalism are the most appropriate
paradigms through which to analyze the Nondelegation Doctrine.

A. Constitutional Theory
The predominant constitutional theories are Originalism,
which is premised on the intent of the Framers, the intent of the
ratifiers, original methods, or the original public meaning,117 Living
POSSESSORY ESTATES AND FUTURE INTERESTS PRIMER 2 n.2, 172-205 (3d ed.
2007) (noting regarding conveyances how future interests are present property
rights and whether the Rule against Perpetuities has been violated may be
determined at the time of conveyance, although the modern trend is to “wait
and see”).
115. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2018).
The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; . . . or
unwarranted by the facts. . . .
Id.
116. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 2, at 322-23 (discussing the Nondelegation
Doctrine in a work describing social contract theory, upon which commonwealth
governments are formed).
117. For Originalism premised on the intent of the Framers, see Nat’l Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 626-46 (1949) (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting) (analyzing how, in the absence of the Framers’ “specific intent,” “a
provision concerned solely with the mechanics of government,” such as a citizen
of the District of Columbia not having diversity to a citizen of a State under U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cannot be construed to have a meaning more amenable to
the times, for the Court does not have an “amendatory function”); Kelo v. City
of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506-11 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(differentiating “public use” from “public purpose” by distinguishing nuisance
law and eminent domain law with respect to private property at English
common law and arguing that English common law informed the Framers’
intent, which therefore fixes the meaning of the Public Use Clause under U.S.
CONST. amend. V [hereinafter “Fifth Amendment”]). For Originalism premised
on the intent of the ratifiers, see Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 n.130 (1981) (explaining how the intent of the
ratifiers should control over the intent of the Framers, presumably because it is
the ratifiers who gave legal force and effect to the Constitution, but uncertainty
regarding the former requires the latter to become a “fair reflection” of the
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Originalism,118
and
Living
Constitutionalism.119
These
constitutional theories all receive significant criticism,120 but
analysis of the Nondelegation Doctrine need not resolve these
disputes, for many of those constitutional theories are

former). For Originalism premised on original methods, see H. Jefferson Powell,
The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 894-902
(1985) (examining how the “intent” of written legal documents, such as
contracts and statutes, might have been ascertained subjectively or objectively
at common law, inter alia); id. at 885-88 (finding how early constitutional
theorists would have relied on common law interpretation of the Constitution,
if at all, and how they would have examined the intent behind the Constitution,
but that intent would not have been the subjective intent of the Framers or the
ratifiers). For Originalism premised on the original public meaning, see Kelo,
545 U.S. at 511-14 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing how states had similar
eminent domain language in their constitutions as that in the Fifth Amendment
and how many behaved in a manner indicative of Justice Thomas’
interpretation of “public use”).
118. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE
L.J. 239, 241-47, 262-67 (2009) (arguing that Originalism evolves “to reflect
current interpretive values” just like Living Constitutionalism evolves “to
reflect current societal values” but noting that Originalism is not necessarily
debunked for attempting to fix the Constitution’s meaning when it itself is a
fluid theory); BALKIN, supra note 7, at 3-58 (describing the method of text and
principle, where the Constitution contains an interpretive framework
ascertainable under Originalist methods, but irreducibly vague phrases within
that framework should be construed in such a manner that promotes
Constitutional Redemption for every generation of Americans).
119. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 5, at 68-79 (theorizing that the Constitution
should be construed with its written and unwritten aspects in mind but arguing
that the unwritten Constitution does not include the proposition that the
United States is a Christian nation as a result of the “Year of Our Lord” phrase
beneath Article VII, because such construction would explicitly contravene the
Establishment Clause of U.S. CONST. amend. I); id. (tethering therefore the
unwritten Constitution to the written Constitution by prohibiting explicit
contradictions of the text); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877-81, 884-89 (1996) (arguing that many
other constitutional theories, such as Originalism, are premised on sovereign
command but that the common law, with its inherent malleability, would be a
more historical and optimal modus operandi of applying constitutional
principles).
120. E.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U.L.
REV. 226, 245-48 (1988) (describing how Originalism premised on original
intent has been criticized for being unable to determine how it would be possible
to ascertain the intent of a collection of people, when intent technically reduces
to one person’s psychological state, and explaining why the original intent of
the ratifiers should supersede that of the Framers under Originalism’s logic);
James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral
Readings of the American Constitution, 92 B.U.L. REV. 1171, 1173 (2012)
(describing, although not necessarily criticizing, how Living Originalists dress
“up their theories in the garb of originalism”); id. at 1180-82 (criticizing how
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation fails to distinguish between
constitutional law (i.e., precedent interpreting the Constitution) and the
Constitution itself).
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inapplicable.121 Although cases nominally point to the Legislative
Vesting Clause as the locus of the Nondelegation Doctrine, the
Legislative Vesting Clause neither says anything about the extent
to which legislative power may be delegated after having vested nor
implies a mechanism to ascertain that extent.122 The Nondelegation
Doctrine contains a fundamental indeterminacy in its relation to
the constitutional text.123
To demonstrate the fundamental indeterminacy through
reductio ad absurdum, assume that the Nondelegation Doctrine is
fixed within the Legislative Vesting Clause.124 However, although
the Nondelegation Doctrine is usually applied to the legislative
branch, it also applies just as much to the executive and judicial
branches.125 The Constitution contains Executive and Judicial
Vesting Clauses, which therefore should also be loci of the
Nondelegation Doctrine.126 However, the Nondelegation Doctrine
cannot then be fixed within the Legislative Vesting Clause, and
therefore the Nondelegation Doctrine is neither fixed there nor
anywhere else.127 This Comment focuses primarily on legislative
delegations to officials from other branches, primarily the executive
branch, as when Congress delegates to the President.128
Nevertheless, the Nondelegation Doctrine applies to all forms of
121. See infra notes 130-135 and accompanying text (explaining the
inapplicability of these constitutional theories).
122. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining the origins of the
Nondelegation Doctrine).
123. See infra notes 125-128 and accompanying text (explaining the
fundamental indeterminacy of the Nondelegation Doctrine in its relation to the
Constitution).
124 See generally Dale Jacquette, Mathematical Proof and Discovery
Reductio ad Absurdum, 28 INFORMAL LOGIC 242, 244-46 (2008) (explaining
reductio ad absurdum with examples).
125. The Supreme Court of New York at General Term sitting in Kings
County wrote:
[T]he same reasoning that would permit a legislator to transfer his
power to his constituents, would authorize any other elective officer to
do the same. Thus the governor when applied to, to pardon a criminal,
might, being unwilling to take the responsibility of deciding upon the
application himself, call an election and submit it to the people. The
courts, whenever a case of peculiar difficulty came before them, might
call together their constituents to ascertain how the popular feeling
stood. . . . Every person must perceive how preposterous such a
proceeding would be! And how deservedly contemptible every officer and
court who should resort to such means of evading the just responsibilities
of his office, would be held.
Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 8, at 413 (quoting Thorne v. Cramer, 15
Barb. 112, 116-17 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1851)).
126. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
127. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, and U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
128. Wayman, 23 U.S. at 42-43, 45; J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at
413.
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delegations, which need not originate from Congress.129
By contrast, Originalism premised on the intent of the
Framers, the intent of the ratifiers, and original public meaning
focuses on specific language and finds meaning therein.130 The
Nondelegation Doctrine is found in no specific language of the
Constitution and is therefore incompatible with those three forms
of Originalism.131 Neither is Living Constitutionalism compatible,
if only explicit textual contradiction limits possible constitutional
construction,132 because the Constitution’s text does not make any
explicit references to the Nondelegation Doctrine133. Under this
standard of limitation, it could be argued that the Nondelegation
Doctrine should both exist and not exist at the same time. No one
seriously contends that our tripartite system of government should
become unitary. It would defeat the purpose of a tripartite system
of government if those branches, when vested with their powers,134
could simply choose to delegate all their powers away, for their
distinctions would then be without a difference. A theory that
renders that outcome possible should not be applicable to the
Nondelegation Doctrine.
However, although Professor Jack M. Balkin’s Living
Originalism focuses on specific language for purposes of
ascertainment,135 and therefore could encounter similar
aforementioned issues, its theory of constitutional redemption
promotes the renewal of every generation’s consent to be bound by
this social contract that is the Constitution of the United States.136
The fundamental purpose behind the Nondelegation Doctrine is to
make certain that branches of government themselves properly
decide the issues the People assign them through her Constitution.
This is to prevent those branches from merely kicking the can down
the road. That purpose is intrinsic to constitutional renewal.
Originalism premised on original methods,137 Living
129. Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 8, at 413.
130. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581-88 (2008)
(interpreting “to keep and bear arms” by researching contemporary dictionary
definitions and narrowing down the definitions by reasoning through the
implications of “to keep” and “to bear” being conjoined).
131. See U.S. CONST. (containing no such explicit language).
132. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing differing
constitutional interpretations).
133. See U.S. CONST. (containing no such explicit language).
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. III, §
1.
135. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (describing Balkin’s
discussion on Living Originalism).
136. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the social contract
theory).
137. Originalism premised on original methods must be applied in such a
manner that it does not rely on specific language, due to issues relating to the
fundamental indeterminacy of the Nondelegation Doctrine. For an example of
a form of such Originalism that does rely on specific language, see John O.
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Constitutionalism’s Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,138
structural reasoning,139 and Living Originalism, to the extent
discussed, all remain applicable to the Nondelegation Doctrine.
Results from applying those constitutional theories should be
compared. What this analysis demonstrates is that the
Nondelegation Doctrine should be ascertained through general
methods, not outcome-determinative rules. But remember – it is all
just a theory: a constitutional theory.140

McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
751, 756 (2009) (“There are also interpretive rules, defined as rules that provide
guidance on how to interpret the language in a document.”). It also argues that
original methods applying these interpretive rules could solve the issue of
irreducibly vague constitutional text not having a fixable meaning without
resorting to construction. Id. at 751-58 However, this Comment will attempt to
apply such Originalism without being tethered to specific language in § III(B)
infra.
138. This Comment does not take the position that precedent interpreting
and construing the Constitution is itself the Constitution. That said, some
Originalists premised on original methods may contend that only original
methods should be used to interpret the Constitution. However, if it seems
imprecise to determine a multi-member body’s intent, it would seem all the
more imprecise to determine a multi-member body’s intended result from
applying sometimes conflicting methods that by design are not outcomedeterminative. The justification for original methods may be more along the
lines of how it limits the set of possible “correct” interpretations. Nevertheless,
the true persuasiveness of original methods comes from how the common law,
as articulated by Sir William Blackstone, 1 MELVIN L. UROFSKY & PAUL
FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 83-87 (3d ed. 2011) (describing how, although some Americans
did want to break completely from the British legal system, the common law as
articulated by Sir Blackstone ultimately withstood the test of time during and
after the American Revolution, probably due to the common law’s merits). Also,
other enlightened political philosophies strongly influenced the Founding
Fathers and have much more independent merit, arguably more than any other
legal tradition at that time. Id. However, the common law was by no means
perfect. Id. at 84. Some amendments do mandate constructive rules on the
courts. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; U.S. CONST. amend XI. However, courts develop
new interpretive and constructive rules that improve on those imperfect
original methods and do not make their way into the Constitution all the time.
It strains credulity to suppose that amendments must sanction all innovations
in constitutional interpretive and constructive method before courts may use
them. Moreover, amendments passed after the Founding technically have
different original methods with respect to the Framers or ratifiers that passed
them, and many amendments, such as U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, heavily modify
the Constitution from the Founding Fathers. Thus, the Founding Fathers’
original methods should be recognized for their special merits and should be
applied to the Nondelegation Doctrine, but that application does not estop other
methods, which may have independent merit of their own.
139. See generally CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10-15, 17-19, 22-27, 29-32 (1969) (explaining structural
reasoning as a method of construing the Constitution).
140. An homage to The Game Theorists, YOUTUBE, www.youtube.com/user/
MatthewPatrick13 [perma.cc/47GH-HBLM] (last visited May 18, 2020).
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B. Applying Such Proper Constitutional Theories to
Congressional Delegations to the President
There are many original methods,141 and it may feel like
searching for a needle in a haystack to find original methods
relevant to the Nondelegation Doctrine. However, Sir William
Blackstone, a major influence on the Founding Fathers and their
generation, and his canons of statutory construction will be useful
to analyze the Nondelegation Doctrine for new nondelegation
principles.142 One such canon is ut res magis valeat, quam pereat
(“One part of a statute must be so construed by another, that the
whole may (if possible) stand . . .”).143 Implicit in that canon is that
each part of the statute is presumed not to be superfluous; in fact,
another general interpretive rule from original methods is that
constitutional text should not be rendered “redundant or
surplusage.”144
Applied to the Constitution and the Nondelegation Doctrine,
with structural reasoning, Sir Blackstone’s canon and the
aforementioned interpretive rule yield some meaningful results.145
The Constitution provides that the President “shall take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”146 The Constitution also provides
for legislative power through enumerated powers and implied
powers pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause.147 When
Congress delegates to the President, Congress does so under an
enumerated power in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper
Clause.148
141. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 137, at 755-58 (discussing various
original methods).
142. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 138, at 83-87.
143. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *89 (analyzing, for example,
how an act of Parliament vesting land in “the king and his heirs, saving the
right of A,” and a lease providing for A in the land for three years suggests that
A has a term of years of three and that the king has a vested remainder in fee
simple).
144. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 137, at 756 (justifying this
interpretive rule on the grounds that people writing formal documents
intentionally tend to eliminate redundancies).
145. See infra notes 149-152 and accompanying text (applying Sir
Blackstone’s canon and interpretive rule).
146. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
148. Even without the Necessary and Proper Clause, the enumerated
powers in and of themselves would imply that Congress has power to have an
agent carry out the law in such a manner that the agent has absolutely no
discretion, or else the enumerated powers would be mere surplusage as
Congress itself is not expected to execute the law. See, e.g., id., cl. 2 (providing
for Congress to have power to “borrow money on the credit of the United States,”
but, if Congress wants to borrow a specific amount of money from a lender but
is unable to have an agent carry that out, then Congress never truly had that
“power” at all). Congressional delegation to agents who have no discretion is
consistent with the rationale in Marshall Field & Co., 143 U.S. at 692-93.
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However, the Take Care Clause limits the contours of that
delegation, particularly because of the usage of the word
“faithfully.”149 The Take Care Clause would become mere
surplusage should Congress be able to delegate to the President in
such a manner that the President’s duty to execute the law would
exceed the Take Care Clause.150 After all, the Constitution could
have simply been written without a Take Care Clause, without the
explicit standard that the President’s implied duty is to execute the
law.151 Interpreted under ut res magis valeat, quam pereat, there is
an upper limit to the Nondelegation Doctrine.152 If Congress
delegates to the President a duty to execute a law, and the President
has discretion to fill in the details of the law, the discretion cannot
be so expansive that it dissipates the element of faith necessary to
carry out the law.
To explain, in a popular dictionary from the eighteenth
century, faith is defined as “a[ss]ent” to another’s proposition whose
truth is not “immediately perceived” from one’s own “rea[s]on or
experience” but is “believe[d]” to have been “discovered and known
by the other.”153 In other words, there is no faith in knowledge, and
a president who knows the laws he or she must execute – because
he or she created those laws – need not and cannot execute them
faithfully.154 There must be some daylight between the President
and the laws he or she must execute, for “there is a particular
danger when you combine prosecuting a person with the writing of
the law under which you prosecute.”155 This principle should apply
to any authority in other officials derived from the President. This
result is also consistent with precedent that implies Congress does
not re-delegate its legislative powers in contravention of delegata
potestas non potest delegari but instead exercises its legislative
powers and compels other officials pursuant to their own inherent
powers to realize that legislative vision.156

However, the conjunction of the Necessary and Proper Clause with the
enumerated power allows Congress to modify the agent’s discretion in filling in
the “minor details” of the law as the agent carries the law out. Wayman, 23 U.S.
at 42-43, 45. The extent to which Congress may modify the agent’s discretion is
the Nondelegation Doctrine fundamentally for Congressional delegations.
149. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
150. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 137, at 756 (discussing the mere
surplusage rule).
151. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
152. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *89.
153. NATHAN BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(London, Thomas Cox, 2d ed. 1731).
154. Id.
155. Oral Argument at 37:01, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086),
www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-6086 [perma.cc/K3VZ-ZFMP].
156. See supra note 42 (discussing delegation of legislative vs. nonlegislative power).
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C. Clinton v. City of New York
Another precedent that informs the debate about what the
Nondelegation Doctrine should be post-Gundy is Clinton v. City of
New York.157 It will be shown that the dissent was correct in
pointing out the nondelegation issues but that the Court was
nevertheless correct in its holding.
After President Clinton signed the Line Item Veto Act of 1996
(“Line Item Veto Act”) into law on April 9, 1996, immediately there
were questions regarding its constitutional validity.158 Before
proceeding further with the discussion of the Line Item Veto Act, it
is critical to clarify that it applied only to a bill relating to
discretionary budgetary authority, new direct spending, or limited
tax benefits and did not allow the President to cross out provisions
in a bill and then sign the edited version into law.159 Rather, the
President signed the bill in whole, and then the Line Item Veto Act
operated on the new law and allowed the President to cancel out
portions of the statute after certain criteria had been met.160 Those
criteria are that those cancellations must “reduce the Federal
budget deficit,” “not impair any essential Government functions,”
and “not harm the national interest.”161
The history of the Line Item Veto Act is ripe with controversy,
but it is facially concerned with the Presentment Clause.162 The
Constitution requires that all bills Congress passes be presented
before the President, who may sign or veto them, and, if he or she
vetoes them, Congress may override those vetoes through
157. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
158. Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996),
invalidated by Clinton, 524 U.S. 417; Thomas C. Weisert, Timing Isn’t
Everything: The Supreme Court Decides that a Presidential Cancellation Does
Indeed “Walk, Swim, and Quack” like a Line-Item Veto, 29 SETON HALL L. REV.
1618, 1626-28 (1999) (remarking also that passage of the Line Item Veto Act
required a confluence of political factors).
159. Weisert, supra note 158, at 1628 n.43.
160. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 473-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“When the
President ‘canceled’ the two appropriation measures now before us, he did not
repeal any law nor did he amend any law. He simply followed the law, leaving
the statutes, as they are literally written, intact.”); Mary E. Foster, The Line
Item Veto Act After Raines v. Byrd, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 323, 323 (1998).
This Article was actually written just as the Supreme Court was about to hear
oral arguments for Clinton v. City of New York. Id. at 351.
161. Michael G. Locklar, Is the 1996 Line-Item Veto Constitutional?, 34
HOUS. L. REV. 1161, 1173 n.90 (1997).
162. Foster, supra note 160, at 324-25 (explaining that, initially, Members
of Congress, who presumably did not vote for the bill, challenged the
constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act in federal court, and President
Clinton declined to exercise any powers under it as the case was pending). But
see id. at 325-26; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829-30 (1997) (explaining that
the Supreme Court held that the case was not ripe for adjudication and that
President Clinton began cancelling provisions from statutes in accordance with
the Line Item Veto Act from then).
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supermajorities.163 Justice Breyer, Justice O’Connor, and Justice
Scalia, a rather unusual coalition,164 fairly and succinctly
articulated the Court’s syllogistic reasoning in invalidating the Line
Item Veto Act.165 The fallacy in the Court’s logic goes back to the
mechanics of the Line Item Veto Act, for the President does not
actually repeal or amend any laws pursuant to any constitutional
powers.166 Rather, he or she exercises only his or her statutory
powers under the Line Item Veto Act, which merely deprives any
cancelled law of its legal effects.167 As Justice Breyer himself
acknowledges, this is a nuanced logical distinction, but he
demonstrates it by hypothesizing about how a challenged law on
which the Line Item Veto Act operated in Clinton could have been
reworded to satisfy the Court’s concerns.168 This demonstration is
exactly the kind of Congressional delegation of power that is the

163. The Presentment Clause more fully reads:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return
it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated,
who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to
reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall
agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to
the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
164. See Robin West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Foreword: Taking
Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 55 n.68 (1990) (describing Justice
O’Connor and Justice Scalia’s longstanding feud as to whether a rules-based
approach or a standards-based approach is better).
165. Justice Breyer illustrated the majority’s logic as follows:
Major Premise: The Constitution sets forth an exclusive method for
enacting, repealing, or amending laws.
Minor Premise: The Act authorizes the President to "repeal or amend"
laws in a different way, namely by announcing a cancellation of a portion
of a previously enacted law.
Conclusion: The Act is inconsistent with the Constitution.
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 474.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Justice Breyer hypothesizes:
Section One. Taxes . . . that were collected by the State of New York from
a health care provider before June 1, 1997 and for which a waiver of
provisions [requiring payment] have been sought . . . are deemed to be
permissible health care related taxes . . . provided however that the
President may prevent the just-mentioned provision from having legal
force or effect if he determines x, y and z. (Assume x, y and z to be the
same determinations required by the Line Item Veto Act.).
Id. at 475.
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topic of this Comment.169 Justice Breyer is correct that this issue
relates more to the Nondelegation Doctrine than the Presentment
Clause.170
In applying the Panama Refining Co. test, legislative history
demonstrates that the policy underlying the Line Item Veto Act was
to prevent pork-barrel spending.171 However, the Line Item Veto Act
itself does not seem specifically to address this or any other
policy.172 Nevertheless, the criteria (i.e., that those cancellations
must “reduce the Federal budget deficit,” “not impair any essential
Government functions,” and “not harm the national interest”)173 are
standards that limit the President’s discretion, and, under Yakus,
it is sufficient for the fact-finding mission to be that the agency
action should promote the policy and conform to the standards.174
For that reason, if Congress is treated as having declared a policy,
it would seem as though the Line Item Veto Act should have passed
muster under the Nondelegation Doctrine.175
But the result defies common-sense. There should be no way
for the Line Item Veto Act to pass muster under the Nondelegation
Doctrine because it is as extreme a “delegation” as one could
conceive. The Line Item Veto Act essentially says that Congress can
pass a spending or taxing bill with its own policies, but the
President can effectively nullify that spending or taxing statute
under what appears to be a super-policy delegated from Congress to
override the very own policy Congress establishes every time it
passes a bill.176 And yet, formally, after this analysis, the Line Item
Veto Act does not run afoul of the Panama Refining Co. test.177 That
may suggest that, even if the Court brings the test back, it needs
more reinforcement.

169. See Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 416-19.
170. But see Clinton, 524 U.S. at 442-44 (arguing that the Nondelegation
Doctrine does not apply and distinguishing Marshall Field & Co. by asserting
that, in that case, the conditions between the passage of the Tariff Act and an
assessment of a Presidential tariff may be materially different, but, here, the
conditions between the passage of a law and Presidential action to apply the
Line Item Veto Act to deprive the law of legal effect are not materially different).
Where this Comment differs from Justice Stevens is in asserting that the
Nondelegation Doctrine does apply to this case, but the distinction
demonstrates how indeterminate it is and why it must be revised to become
more amenable to application.
171. Pork-barrel spending is where Congressmen add provisions to spending
or taxing bills to benefit local interests, even though the purpose of those bills
is to benefit the nation as a whole. Foster, supra note 160, at 323-24.
172. 110 Stat. at 1200-12.
173. Locklar, supra note 161, 1173 n.96.
174. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 423 (setting such an arguably loose standard).
175. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing the policy of the
Line Item Veto Act).
176. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 444-45.
177. Id. at 442-44.
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D. Reiteration Time
Reiteration time is central to analyzing nondelegation
issues.178 For the purpose of this Comment, reiteration time is
defined as the period with which an agent assesses the situation to
find out whether the condition allowing for a delegation has been
triggered.179 The prime example of a delegation with high
reiteration time180 is J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., where the President
would have to reevaluate equalization conditions “from time to
time,” but not all the time.181 However, Congress has limited agency
discretion only with the proviso that the agent must act “in the
public interest.”182 Congress essentially increases the frequency of
reevaluating the condition (i.e., that the public interest is being
satisfied) to such an extent that the condition is essentially
continuously being triggered.183 In other words, the reiteration time
is extremely low, and the condition is being reevaluated
continuously.184
178. See, e.g., Yakus, 31 U.S. at 427 (legitimizing the standard that agency
action must be “in the public interest,” which implies that (a) the agent is
continuously assessing the situation and that (b) the agent will always say that
the condition has been triggered, because the standard has such a low
threshold). Therefore, (a) and (b) imply that the agent’s power will always be
activated in a delegation limited at most by “the public interest,” unless the
agent suddenly decides that it is no longer acting in the public interest. Id.
179. Id. The period concept here is also analogous to that in elementary
mathematics and physics. See, e.g., Khan Academy, Amplitude, Period,
Frequency, and Wavelength of Periodic Waves, YOUTUBE (Mar. 16, 2010),
www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJW_a6JeXD8 [perma.cc/24UE-92CN] (explaining
period and frequency, inter alia, in the context of periodic waves). In the
sciences, period is convertible to frequency, and, here, it may be more intuitive
to think of the relationships from a frequency standpoint. Id. For example, if
the standard is “in the public interest,” then that implies the frequency of
reevaluation is high and essentially continuous; therefore, the period (the time
the agent gets between reevaluations of the condition’s satisfaction) is
extremely low. E.g., Yakus, 31 U.S. at 427 (providing the other half of the
analogy).
180. That is, the agent has a lot of time to reevaluate the conditions
triggering the delegation. Or the frequency with which the agent must do so is
low. See Khan Academy, supra note 179 (discussing the inverse relationship).
181. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 404-05.
182. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 427 (consolidating several cases where “in the public
interest” or something similar sufficiently limited discretion); Gundy, 139 S. Ct.
at 2129 (consolidating similarly several cases where “in the public interest”
sufficiently limited discretion); Dunnigan, supra note 64, at 261-62 (discussing
one of the first cases to use the standard of “in the public interest” in
nondelegation contexts, to wit, Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943)).
183. But cf. Dunnigan, supra note 64, at 271-72 (proposing that the
Nondelegation Doctrine have a formal factual determination requirement and
therefore implying that standards like “in the public interest” are insufficient
and are therefore in themselves too dissimilar to traditional conditions).
184. See Khan Academy, supra note 179 (discussing the inverse
relationship).
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Ideally, this should not be an issue because, if agents have to
reevaluate their conditions all the time, they should be more ready
to detect when their conditions are no longer being satisfied.185
However, human nature tends towards complacency and
diminished levels of scrutiny when a person has to reevaluate
anything constantly.186 While Americans have a “government of
laws and not men,” the laws are nevertheless being carried out by
humans.187 Recipients of Congressional delegations will accordingly
more likely than not exercise far less scrutiny over the exercise of
their delegated powers, when only something like the “public
interest” constrains them.188 These agents receive no active
reinforcement from a discrete condition they must analyze to
determine whether their delegations have been triggered or are at
an end.189 Thus, reiteration time is directly related to the level of
scrutiny with which recipients of Congressional delegations
exercise over the conditions triggering those delegations.190
Various jurists outside the Supreme Court have noted concerns
about the “public interest” standard for nondelegation issues.191
185. For a stellar example, see Mahler, 264 U.S. 32 (deciding whether the
Secretary was properly delegated power to determine the desirability of aliens).
There, the only limit to the Secretary’s discretion was whether his or her
determination of undesirable aliens comported with the
“common
understanding.” Id. at 40. In other words, the Secretary ideally would be
evaluating all the time whether his or her determinations were comporting with
common understanding. Id. This is unlike Cargo of the Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. at
388, where the President only has to determine discretely one time whether
Great Britain or France have satisfied the conditions.
186. Timothy Ludwig, Complacency Comes When Reinforcement Goes, so
Reinforce More, INDUS. SAFETY & HYGIENE NEWS (July 1, 2016), www.ishn.com/
articles/104361-complacency-comes-when-reinforcement-goes-so-reinforcemore [perma.cc/A9SV-PMAC] (“Common wisdom suggests complacency is built
up over time working a process over and over. ‘Habituation’ may take over. This
means you go on autopilot and your ability to notice changes in the hazard, or
perhaps your own behavior, fades.”). Here, the process being worked over and
over is reevaluation of the conditions triggering a Congressional delegation. See
supra note 185 (discussing Mahler, 264 U.S. 32, where the Secretary had to
reevaluate over and over whether his determinations comported with common
understanding).
187. Marbury, 5 U.S, at 163. See generally Victoria Nourse & Gregory
Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New
Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 90-95 (2009) (discussing legal realism
and how it incorporates social sciences into practicing and theorizing about the
law); Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1915, 1921-26 (2005) (discussing in-depth how legal realists conceived
legal rules and the nuances thereof in terms of actions and obligations).
188. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 427.
189. Cf. People v. Carter, 97 Ill. 2d 133, 148, 150 (1982) (Moran, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the “public interest” is too vague a standard to be
permissible under Illinois’s Nondelegation Doctrine).
190. See supra note 178-189 and accompanying text (discussing reiteration
time).
191. E.g., Carter, 97 Ill. 2d at 150 (Moran, J., dissenting) (“The vague ‘public
interest’ standard for granting the exemptions creates too great a danger of
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However, most courts, not desiring to oppose the Supreme Court’s
post-Yakus jurisprudence, have not decided to invalidate a
delegation on the public interest grounds.192 By contrast, legal
scholarship has indeed thrown a much less flattering light on the
public interest standard, from many angles.193 Demanding someone
to be on watch 24/7 will naturally be less effective than requesting
someone to be on watch at specific moments in time, four times a
day. If agents have more reiteration time, with more precise goals
in reevaluating whether their Congressional delegations remain in
effect, delegation will become more discrete and immediate.194
Discrete and immediate delegations let the People feel as though it
is their elected representatives, not unelected bureaucrats, who run
the show.195 However, the nature of administrative agencies has
changed.196 Initially, there were no permanent administrative
agencies, but as time went on, permanent administrative agencies
proliferated.197 Whether standards should be applied differently if
arbitrary classification to uphold, especially when the personal liberty of the
defendant may be at stake in a criminal proceeding.”); AARP v. EEOC, 390 F.
Supp. 2d 437, 451 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (concerning a delegation to an agency to make
exemptions in the public interest); id. at 452-54 (questioning, ultimately
hypothetically, whether it would be proper for the agency to interpret a statute
against Congress’ own explicitly interpretation, for the agency would seemingly
have no details to fill).
192. E.g., Free Speech v. Reno, No. 98 Civ. 2680 (MBM), U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3058, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1999) (holding that the public interest standard
was sufficiently specific so as not to violate the Nondelegation Doctrine).
193. See Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too
Indeterminate to Be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427, 443-45 (2001)
(mentioning a number of scholars who have criticized the public interest
standard as being too weak, too indeterminate, too discretionary, etc.).
194. Foundationally, the legislative process is supposed to be restrictive,
with overruling a Presidential veto requiring a high bar. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7;
see also Filibuster and Cloture, UNITED STATES SENATE, www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm
[perma.cc/Y8FY-2GGA] (last visited Oct. 31, 2020) (explaining the filibuster,
which is not found in the Constitution but in practice adds an additional layer
of difficulty for legislation to pass through Congress); Alfred C. Aman, Jr.,
Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the
Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1202 (1988)
(discussing how the Founding Fathers took their minimalist government for
granted). For Congress to be able to pass legislation with so many blank details,
and to have the President or administrative agencies fill in those details, defeats
the purpose of having such a restrictive legislative process in the first place.
195. See Jill Rosen, Washington Bureaucrats Tend to Believe Americans
Know ‘Very Little’ About Key Issues, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. (Sep. 28, 2016),
hub.jhu.edu/2016/09/28/low-opinion-dc-insiders-american-public/
[perma.cc/59BS-PZLE] (demonstrating this wide divide between regular
citizens and bureaucrats, who are delegated their power).
196. A. Michael Nolan, State Agency-Based v. Central Panel Jurisdictions:
Is There a Deference?, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 5-6 (2009)
(presenting how the Interstate Commerce Commission was the first permanent
administrative agency in 1887).
197. Id.
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administrative agencies are temporary or permanent is certainly
plausible.
IV. PROPOSAL
In Gundy, the dissent signaled that it would overturn the
Intelligible Principle test and revert the Nondelegation Doctrine
back to the Panama Refining Co. test.198 The Panama Refining Co.
test has the aforementioned three elements.199 To reiterate, they
are that Congress must (1) declare a policy with respect to the
subject matter, (2) set up a standard for the agent’s actions, and (3)
require a finding by the agent in the exercise of authority to enact
the law.200 They should remain. However, the analysis has
demonstrated that new principles should be applied to the
Nondelegation Doctrine, whether as new elements or new manners
of viewing the elements.201

A. The Faithfulness Element
(4) There must be such separation between the process of
writing the law and executing the law such that the processes are
not unified in the same figure, unless the recipient of the
Congressional delegation is the President.202 “Power tends to
corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”203 This quotation
may be a bit hyperbolic, but there is a basis for being concerned
about conjoining the powers within the agents of the President,
members of the unelected bureaucracy.204 The same danger about
power tending to corrupt may also apply to the President, who is an
198. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“But JUSTICE
ALITO supplies the fifth vote for today’s judgment and he does not join either
the plurality’s constitutional or statutory analysis, indicating instead that he
remains willing, in a future case with a full Court, to revisit these matters.
Respectfully, I would not wait.”); id. at 2130-31 (Alito, J., concurring) (“But
because a majority is not willing to do that, it would be freakish to single out
the provision at issue here for special treatment.”). Justice Kavanaugh had not
heard the oral arguments and therefore recused himself.
199. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 418.
200. Id. at 416-19. But see Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136-37 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (combining the second and third elements, maintaining the first
element, but adding another element for assignments of non-legislative
responsibilities, such as powers inherent to other branches, like the President’s
powers over foreign policy).
201. See supra § III(B), (C), (D) (analyzing the issues with the Nondelegation
Doctrine).
202. See supra § III(B) (applying proper constitutional theories to
congressional delegations to the president).
203. John Dalberg-Acton, Lord Acton writes to Bishop Creighton that the
same moral standards should be applied to all men, political and religious
leaders included, especially since “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power
corrupts absolutely” (1887), LIBERTY FUND, oll.libertyfund.org/quotes/214
[perma.cc/5XPF-9UHM] (last visited Oct. 27, 2020).
204. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (iterating the dangers).
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elected official.205 However, unlike the President’s agents, the
President has unitary executive theory, which does justify the
President having substantial powers alone.206 In addition, if the
concern over corrupting power continues to endure, the President is
only one person, so he or she cannot practically receive and exercise
too much delegated powers anyway without assigning them to his
agents.207

B. The Impracticability Element
(5) Directly exercising the delegated power must be so
impracticable for Congress itself to do, that it would interfere with
the legislative process for Congress to do so. Chief Justice Stone
famously said the following:
The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government
does not demand the impossible or the impracticable. It does not
require that Congress find for itself every fact upon which it desires
to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed
determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to the
application of the legislative policy to particular facts and
circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to
investigate.208

He is absolutely correct. At the same time, on the other end of
the spectrum, the Constitution does demand that Congress perform
functions for which it is entirely practicable for Congress itself to
do.209 For example, it would be inconceivable for Congress to
delegate its power to set the budget for the federal government to
an administrative agency of economics professors, even if Congress
sets out a policy, establishes certain guidelines and limits on
205. See Dalberg-Acton, supra note 203 (distinguishing not between
whether the recipient of power is elected or unelected).
206. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-723 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for unitary executive theory in the context of a controversy
over the degree of autonomy in the independent counsel). Compare U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1 (vesting all executive power in one person), with U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 1 (vesting all legislative power in a bicameral legislature), and U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1 (vesting all judicial power in federal courts, which would likely have
numerous personnel).
207. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (vesting all executive power in one person).
208. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 424.
209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting the power for Congress to declare
war). There are many powers of Congress where it would be impracticable on
its face for Congress itself to perform. See, e.g., id. at cl. 10 (punishing piracies
and felonies on the high seas, such act of punishing presumably requiring
dedicated prosecutors who could devote their time to such an effort). However,
declaring war is one of those actions where it would be inconceivable for
Congress to delegate away. Congress may certainly create commissions to find
facts about an international conflict, but absent truly extreme circumstances, it
would never be so impracticable that Congress cannot perform its function to
declare war. Id. at cl. 11.
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discretion, and requires findings that its actions promote that policy
and follows those standards, all in the public interest.210 There are
certain questions that Congress must itself answer and cannot
delegate to another entity, because they are so fundamental to the
institution and the reason people elect Congressmen and Senators
in the first place.211
In Clinton, the Line Item Veto Act required the President to
find that overturning a spending or taxing statute furthered the
policy thereof.212 Even though this requirement may have formally
satisfied the third element of the Panama Refining Co. test, this
requirement would not satisfy this new fifth element.213 In Cargo of
the Brig Aurora, it was necessary for Congress to delegate tariffenacting powers to the President, for Members of Congress cannot
be expected to monitor the conditions prevailing overseas in order
to determine whether the conditions for tariffs have been
satisfied.214 That is the President’s job as the sole organ of foreign
policy.215 In Mahler, members of Congress are not going to be able
to determine which aliens residing in the United States are
undesirable or not on a case-by-case basis, albeit that delegation
may violate other principles.216 By contrast, nothing about the factfinding mission of the Line Item Veto Act makes it impracticable for
Congress itself to act.217 It would not be impracticable for Congress
to make its own decision as to whether a spending or taxing bill
should be passed or not, if it wants to prevent pork-barrel
210. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 416-19.
211. Cf. Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the
Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV.
2019, 2029-41 (2018) (describing the development of the major questions
doctrine, which also evaluates whether it is appropriate for an administrative
agency to fill in the details of a statute, where those details may indeed not be
minor in deciding a question of such magnitude that it would only be
appropriate for Congress to answer).
212. But see Clinton, 524 U.S. at 442-44 (arguing that the Nondelegation
Doctrine does not apply and distinguishing Marshall Field & Co. by asserting
that, in that case, the conditions between the passage of the Tariff Act and an
assessment of a Presidential tariff may be materially different, but, here, the
conditions between the passage of a law and Presidential action to apply the
Line Item Veto Act to deprive the law of legal effect are not materially different).
213. Indeed, Congress had already exercised its ability to pass the
legislation in the first place, and it did not leave details to be filled in. Clinton,
524 U.S. at 473-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Instead, the President essentially
overwrites those details with his or her own policy preferences. Id. There is
therefore no impracticality for Congress directly to exercise its powers itself,
because it literally did do so, and the President is overwriting that policy, not
filling in the details.
214. Cargo of the Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. at 388.
215. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the President would accept or
receive ambassadors and therefore implying that it is the President’s
prerogative to determine what constitutes an ambassador and therefore which
nations the United States recognizes).
216. Mahler, 264 U.S. at 40.
217. See supra note 213 (discussing the impracticality argument).
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spending.218

C. Reiteration Time Considerations
The public interest standard is too generic and should not
provide for a good Congressional delegation under any
circumstance.219 The public interest standard sets the reiteration
time extremely low and therefore leads to little scrutiny from agents
reevaluating whether the conditions triggering their power still
stand.220 Moreover, from a common-sense standpoint, rare will be
the public servant who comes to the epiphany that he or she is not
acting in the public interest.221 That said, the actual reiteration
time the President or an administrative agency receives should
depend on the circumstances. For example, a permanent
administrative agency may need more flexibility with its reiteration
time to handle disparate situations without having to go back to
Congress every time.222 Nevertheless, the blank check of an “in the
public interest” delegation should still be too much for the most
permanent of institutions.223

D. Reanalyzing Gundy
Whether people agree, the plurality did reason that the facts of
Gundy would pass constitutional muster under the Panama
Refining Co. test.224 Whether they would pass muster under this
Comment’s new proposed restrictions is a different question. The
move the plurality makes that confounds the Panama Refining Co.
test is that it places the interpretation and construction question
before the nondelegation issue.225 “It is elementary when the
constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if the statute be reasonably
218. Foster, supra note 160, at 323-24.
219. See supra § III(D) (discussing reiteration time and the public interest
standard).
220. See supra notes 185-190190 and accompanying text (describing the
issues with the public interest standard).
221. Dalberg-Acton, supra note 203.
222. See Nolan, supra note 197-197 and accompanying text (overviewing the
permanency aspect of administrative agencies in the modern era).
223. See supra § III(D) (discussing reiteration time and the public interest
standard).
224. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the plurality
reasoning in Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2128-30).
225. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2128-30 (construing SORNA in such a manner as
to conclude that Congress actually had made the decision to apply SORNA to
pre-enactment sex offenders in general but left to the Attorney General the
decision as to which pre-enactment sex offenders SORNA should apply in
accordance with feasibility constraints, which the Attorney General must
determine on a case-by-case basis); see also id. at 2119 (“Given that standard, a
nondelegation inquiry always begins (and often almost ends) with statutory
interpretation.”).

1082

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:705

susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our plain duty to adopt
that construction which will save the statute from constitutional
infirmity.”226 This is an absolutely fascinating question because
these two longstanding doctrines227 seem to be heading for a direct
collision.228 Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this Comment to
opinionate on this issue, because the Faithfulness Element and the
Impracticality Element do not depend on the statutory text itself
and therefore could not be defeated by interpretation and
construction.229
As Justice Breyer pointed out, “there is a particular danger
when you combine prosecuting a person with the writing of the law
under which you prosecute.”230 The Attorney General serves at the
pleasure of the President, and therefore the Faithfulness Element
should apply to the Attorney General, as much as to the
President.231 Here, there is absolutely no daylight between the
writing of the law and the execution of the law.
Moreover, it would not be impracticable for Congress itself to
determine feasibility by analyzing the costs and benefits with its
own set of eyes. The Attorney General makes the ultimate
determination of whether SORNA applies to certain classes of
people and then is asked to apply SORNA to those people.232 But,
the Attorney General is simply in no better a position than Congress
226. United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,
407 (1909) (stating what has become the Constitutional Avoidance Canon).
227. That is, the Nondelegation Doctrine and the Constitutional Avoidance
Canon.
228. When it is all boiled down, the Nondelegation Doctrine is about
Congress being sloppy and giving others too much of a blank check to carry out
its will. See supra 8-17 and accompanying text (discussing the general policy
considerations behind the Nondelegation Doctrine). On the other hand, the
Constitutional Avoidance Canon is about the judicial branch interpreting and
construing statutory text leniently, so as not to conflict with the legislative
branch. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. at 407. Here, in Gundy, the Court used the
Constitutional Avoidance Canon to read into the delegation the restriction that
presumably would put SORNA in compliance with the plurality’s
understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine. See supra note 112 and
accompanying text. The only point this Comment will make on this issue is that
this is a nice bailout for Congress, but how much judicial economy is there to
keep bailing Congress out?
229. Reiteration time considerations do, however, depend upon the statutory
text. See supra § III(D) (discussing reiteration time).
230. Oral Argument at 37:01, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086), supra
note 107.
231. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also Donald J. Kochan, Dealing with Dirty
Deeds: Matching Nemo dat Preferences with Real Property Law Pragmatism, 64
U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 5-7 (2015) (discussing the common law principle of nemo dat
quod non habet (i.e., “No one gives who does not have”) in the context of real
estate). In this context, the President cannot give a power the Faithfulness
Element does not constrain, for all the President’s powers are unencumbered
by it.
232. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d).
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so that it would be impracticable for Congress to make this policy
decision itself. Finally, the plurality mentions how the public
interest standard has been upheld a lot in support of its argument,
but it is not completely clear whether it applies to SORNA.233
Nevertheless, what this reanalysis has demonstrated is that the
facts of Gundy would not pass muster under the two new elements,
regardless of how the statute is construed.

V. CONCLUSION
The Nondelegation Doctrine is one of the oldest legal topics,
and it is one that has received some of the most scholarly
contributions. The Intelligible Principle test should be stricken
down because it does not adequately assure fidelity to the People
from administrative agencies. However, people should be cautious
about reverting to the original Nondelegation Doctrine because it
may not be much better than the one it is replacing. Admittedly,
adding the Faithfulness Element, the Impracticality Element, and
restricting reiteration time may not perfect the Nondelegation
Doctrine, but it should go some way towards fashioning a more
perfect Union.

233. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 1229.
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